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Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.1 Introduction 
Environmental pollution and corruption have been inseparable twin evils in current China. The 
immediate motivation for this book is to link the environment and corruption with China’s large 
inflows of foreign direct investment (FDI). It investigates the effects of economic development 
and foreign investment on the pollution in China; the effects of corruption and governance 
quality on FDI location choice in China; and the relationship between environmental regulation 
stringency and FDI, as well as the role of corruption played in this relationship.    
Since 1978 the Chinese government has been reforming its economy from a centrally planned to 
a market-oriented economy, known as “socialism with Chinese characteristics”. The results of 
this dramatic transformation have been the generation of wealth on a previous unimagined scale 
and the removal of millions from absolute poverty, bringing the poverty rate down from 84 per 
cent in 1981 to 13 per cent in 2008 (World Bank).1 China is the fastest growing country with a 
consistent annual gross domestic product (GDP) growth rate above 8 per cent. By the end of 
2010, China has overtaken Japan as the second largest economy in the world when measured by 
nominal GDP (RMB 40.12 trillion, or $5.93 trillion, see Figure 1.1 for the nominal GDP growth 
of China from 1979 to 2010).2 Removing the impact of inflation, China’s real GDP in 2010 was 
20 times as many as that in 1978. The nominal per capita GDP has also increased from RMB 
381 to RMB 29,992 (about $4,430), which means a growth of 14.7 times in real term. The rapid 
growth has been drawing worldwide attention to China, including academics in a number of 
research areas.  
                                                 
1 Data source: http://data.worldbank.org/country/china. Poverty is defined as the number of people living at < 
$1.25/day measured by purchasing power parity. 
2 United States and Japan’s GDP in 2010 was respectively $14.42 trillion and $5.49 trillion, according to the World 
Bank. RMB is the abbreviation for the Chinese currency, the renminbi, also known as the yuan. 1 trillion = 1,000 
billion = 1,000,000 million in this book.  
 Figure 1.1 China’s Nominal GDP 1978-2010  
 
Source: World Development Indicators database, The World Bank.  
 
Much of China’s success has been driven by a tremendous growth in exports coupled with 
equally impressive increases in FDI. According to the statistics from China’s National Bureau of 
Statistics (NBS), the value of China’s exports grew by an average of 14.7 per cent a year between 
1980 and 2000 and by 27.3 per cent a year between the entry to the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) in 2001 and the world financial crisis in 2008. At the end of 2010 China’s global trade 
exceeded $2.97 trillion with exports of $1.58 trillion. From then on China surpassed Germany to 
be the world’s largest exporting nation and the second largest importer behind the United States 
(US). In addition, China’s trade surplus has been stable at around $30 billion between 1999 and 
2004 but surged rapidly afterwards (varied between $102 billion and $298 billion). In terms of 
FDI, by 2010 China’s inward FDI flows had reached $105.7 billion, up from an average of 
$30.10 billion between 1990 and 2000. The stock of FDI has increased similarly, rising from 
$20.69 billion in 1990 to $1048.38 billion in 2010.  
The Chinese government launched a range of policies to encourage FDI inflows. In 1979, the 
government introduced legislation and regulations designed to encourage foreigners to invest in 
high-priority sectors and regions. The government eliminated restrictions and implemented 
permissive policies in the early 1980s. It established Special Economic Zones in 1980 and then 
opened up coastal cities and development regions in coastal provinces in the mid-1980s. More 
favourable regulations and treatments have been used to encourage FDI inflows in these regions. 
In 1990s, the policies began to promote the high-tech and capital intensive FDI projects in 
accordance with domestic industrial objectives. More preferential tax treatments were granted for 
the investment in selected economic zones or in projects encouraged by the government, such as 
energy, communications and transport. Such preferential policies have resulted in an 
overwhelming concentration of FDI and rapid economic development in the east. The spillover 
effects from coastal to the inland provinces are limited, and therefore, the regional development 
gap has widened.   
Rapid export driven economic growth enhanced by large investment inflows from abroad has 
come at a cost. A harmful by-product of globalization has been increased pollution. The State 
Environmental Protection Administration (the predecessor of Ministry of Environmental 
Protection) reported that two thirds of Chinese cities are considered polluted according to the air 
quality data. Respiratory and heart diseases related to air pollution are the leading causes of death 
in China. Almost all of the nation’s rivers are polluted to some degree and half of the population 
lacks access to clean water. Water scarcity occurs most in northern China and acid rain falls on 
30 per cent of the country. The World Bank estimated that pollution costs about 8-12 per cent 
of China’s GDP each year. Environmental degradation and the increase in poor health are all 
signs that China’s current growth path is unsustainable.3  
There have been numerous theoretical and empirical studies that examine the relationship 
between economic growth and various indicators of environmental degradation. The aim of the 
research is to examine the existence of the “Environmental Kuznets Curve” (EKC), which is 
found firstly in Grossman and Krueger (1991). The hypothesis of EKC indicates that the total 
amount of environmental impact of economic growth initially increases, reaches a peak and then 
falls, illustrated in Figure 1.2. In addition, some researchers have started to use empirical 
methods to examine the effects of FDI on environmental quality, especially in developing 
countries. However, the majority of studies on both the environmental effects of economic 
growth and FDI, are cross-country analyzes and the results are often inconsistent.  
Figure 1.2 Environmental Kuznets Curve 
 
 
Therefore, in the case of China, the following questions are worthy of consideration. Does the 
environmental Kuznets curve hold for some pollutants? If it does, where is the threshold income 
                                                 
3 Sustainable development refers to development that “meets the needs of the present without compromising the 
ability of future generations to meet their own needs”, which is defined in the UN Report of the World Commission 
on Environment and Development, 1987 (http://www.un.org /documents/ga/res/42/ares42-187.htm). 
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level and how many regions have passed it? As an important driving force of economic growth 
in China, does FDI benefit/harm environmental quality? These questions have attracted 
relatively few research using different datasets and methodologies, with mixed results.  
The huge amount of FDI inflows and unbalanced geographical distribution of FDI have 
attracted several studies to investigate the determinants of FDI location choice in China (see for 
example Wei et al., 1999; Coughlin and Segev, 2000; Cheng and Kwan, 2000; and Amiti and 
Javorcik, 2008). In addition to the preferential policies, many factors may have affected where 
foreign investors locate their production facilities within China, such as labour costs, potential 
market size, market access, supplier access, infrastructure, productivity, education level, location, 
and spatial dependence. However, these studies all omitted certain structural determinants of 
FDI, including environmental regulation stringency and government quality. 
Some environmental economists and environmentalists claim that firms in developed countries 
may relocate their “dirty” industries to developing countries to take the advantages of the less 
stringent environmental regulations (see for example Pearson, 1987; Dean, 1992; and Copeland 
and Taylor, 1994). Such a point of view is known as “the pollution haven hypothesis” (PHH).  
In China, the legal system has lagged far behind the overall economic development. Although 
China has established a comprehensive environmental regulatory framework with a range of laws, 
regulations and standards, the strength and the enforcement of the regulations are much weaker 
than those in developed countries. An important issue in the enforcement of environmental 
regulations is of the government itself violating the law. Some local governments would protect 
polluting enterprises in the name of local interest.  Land appropriation, excessive mining and the 
failure to carry out environmental impact assessments: such situations continue due to the lack 
of the environmental awareness among local government officials. Environmental enforcement 
also suffers from a lack of public participation and social supervision, as well as low awareness of 
citizens (Ma, 2007).  The differences in the performance of local government and the 
characteristics of the public have led environmental stringency to vary among regions.  
Multinational corporations (MNCs) could be attracted by the weak environmental regulations in 
China. Ma Jun, director of the nongovernmental Institute of Public and Environmental Affairs 
(IPE), announced in August 2007 that over 100 multinational corporations were punished by the 
government for their violation of the environmental laws and regulations in terms of water 
pollution from 2004. And in January 2008 this figure increased to 260 corporations for water 
pollution and more than 50 corporations for air pollution. The exposed companies include 
subsidiaries of world-renowned corporations such as American Standard, Panasonic, Pepsi, 
Nestle, 3M, Whirlpool, Bosch, Carlsberg, Samsung, Nissin and Kao. These corporations are 
mostly from Japan, US and Europe. One third of their polluting subsidiaries are located in 
Shanghai, and others scattered over the country. Liu (2006) reported that according to Lo Sze 
Ping, campaign director of Greenpeace China, the “words” of multinationals are often better 
than their deeds. Multinationals are more willing to invest in public relations than in actually 
cleaning up the manufacturing process. Local governments seek to attract more FDI and hence 
do not take strict measures to address pollution by multinational corporations. Lo also observes 
that since multinational corporations typically perform better than the domestic enterprises 
environmentally, their activities do not attract the attention of the environmental authorities, and 
hence avoid the supervision. 
Therefore, the regional differences in environmental stringency may have a significant impact on 
the FDI location choice in China, that is to say, an intra-country pollution haven effect may exist. 
Previous empirical studies have adopted different approaches to investigate the PHH (see for 
example Levinson, 1996a & 1996b; List and Co, 2000; Keller and Kevinson, 2002; Xing and 
Kolstad, 2002; Eskeland and Harrison, 2003; Fredriksson et al., 2003; Dean et al., 2005; and 
Smarzynska-Javorcik and Wei, 2005). The results are mixed and do not provide robust evidence 
to support the existence of PHH. However, these studies have several methodological 
weaknesses and are mostly centred on the US data, a few studies look at developing countries 
and only Dean et al. (2005) look at China. Therefore, this book, addressing weaknesses of 
previous studies, makes some contribution to the literature on PHH.  
Rapid economic growth with the lagged development of the legal system has resulted in a serious 
social problem in China – corruption. The transition to a market-based economy has resulted in 
considerable changes to how firms operate within the new commercial business environment. 
The huge increase in opportunities in the private sector combined with the traditional power of 
local and national officials led to a proliferation of corruption at all levels of the Chinese 
economy. Corruption has been recognised as an emerging challenge to China’s economy and 
social reforms.  
Corruption is widely recognised as a deterrent of foreign investment but is only considered in a 
few empirical studies on a cross-country basis (see for example Wheeler and Mody, 1992; Hines, 
1995; Wei, 2000; and Smarzynska and Wei, 2000). Although China has received a high volume of 
foreign capital, corruption has deterred FDI inflows, especially those from Europe and the US. 
Wei (1997) notes that FDI from the ten largest source countries in the world, all of them 
members of Organization of Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), accounts for 
a relatively small portion of total FDI going to China, because investors from the major source 
countries prefer to go to less corrupt countries. Similarly, the corruptibility of local government 
in China may affect the location of FDI. Moreover, corruption should not be considered in 
isolation and is strongly correlated with the quality of government (see Globerman and Shapiro, 
2002 & 2003; Globerman et al., 2006; and Fan et al., 2007). Thus, government quality is another 
important determinant of FDI inflows. Therefore, this book is the first to examine the effects of 
inter-regional differences in corruption and government quality on FDI location choice within a 
large developing country.  
Corruption is also associated with environmental regulations. A common limitation in pollution 
haven studies is that they only consider the impact of environmental regulations on FDI but few 
have considered the endogeneity of environmental regulations. This book firstly considers that 
environmental stringency may be influenced by both corruption and the level of FDI.  
 
1.2 Structure of the Book 
Combining various aspects within the broad area of FDI, governance and the environment, this 
book is structured as follows. Chapter one is the introduction, which outlines related background 
in China, research questions and brief analytical framework in this book. The first part of the 
book includes four substantial chapters looking at effects of economic development and FDI on 
the environment in China. Chapter two examines China’s economic growth and the nature and 
development of inward FDI from its opening up in 1978. Chapter three examines China’s 
natural environment and its environmental pollutions. Particular attention is paid to its water 
pollution, air pollution, solid waste pollution and the cost of pollution. Chapter four reviews the 
theoretical and empirical research on EKC and the impact of FDI on the environment, 
particularly those using Chinese data. Chapter five examines the relationship between economic 
growth and a range of industrial pollution emissions in China using data for 112 major cities 
between 2001 and 2004. After separating foreign investment from Hong Kong, Macao and 
Taiwan from the investment of other foreign economies, we also observe the environmental 
effects of different ownership groups of investment. The results provide some evidence that 
economic growth induces more pollution at current income levels in China. And the 
environmental effects vary across investment groups.  
The second part of this book contains three chapters that consider environmental regulatory 
stringency as a structural determinant of FDI. Chapter six introduces China’s environmental 
protection legal framework and its implementations. It shows the regional differences in terms of 
investment in environmental protection and analyzes the reasons of general weak enforcement 
of environmental regulations in China. Chapter seven reviews the theories and empirical studies 
on pollution haven hypothesis. Chapter eight tests whether pollution havens exist in China using 
socioeconomic and environmental data for 30 Chinese regions over the period from 1999 to 
2003. We address the methodological weaknesses in the previous literature and employ a feasible 
generalized least square method that controls for both autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity. 
The findings provide some evidence to support the existence of a pollution haven effect within 
China. 
The third part of this book consists of four chapters that examine the impact of regional 
government corruption and governance quality on FDI inflows, as well as the impact of FDI and 
corruption on environmental regulation stringency. Chapter nine defines corruption and the 
measures of corruption. It also reviews relevant studies on corruption and governance quality, 
particularly the evidence that explores their impact on FDI location choice. Chapter ten 
introduces the problem of corruption in China, its extend and types, as well as China’s anti-
corruption effort. The lack of a perceptive index of regional government corruption leads us to 
develop two objective indices, measuring the effort of local government in fighting against 
corruption and local government efficiency, respectively. The methodology and results of these 
indices are also reported in Chapter ten. Chapter eleven is the empirical evidence showing that 
government anti-corruption effort and efficiency are both significant determinants of FDI. 
When considering government characteristics affect the environmental stringency, an intra-
country pollution haven effect still exists in China. The empirical study in Chapter twelve 
confirms that an increase in FDI inflows reduces the stringency of environmental regulations but 
such impact can be mitigated by regional anti-corruption effort.  
Chapter thirteen concludes with a review of the results, a discussion of the limitations and 
improvements in data and methodology, the contributions to the literature, challenges and policy 
implementations from findings. It also points out the areas for future research.  
 
